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People v. Pio

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People v. Pio

Case Title and Citation

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Sy Pio, alias Policarpio de la Cruz, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-5848, April 30, 1954
Supreme Court - En Banc
Ponente: Justice Labrador

Facts

  • On the morning of September 3, 1949, the defendant entered the store at 511 Misericordia, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and began firing a .45 caliber pistol he carried.
  • The first shot struck Jose Sy; Tan Siong Kiap, who was in the store and witnessed the entry and firing, asked the defendant, “What is the idea?” Thereupon the defendant turned and fired at Kiap as well.
  • The bullet that hit Kiap entered his right shoulder. Kiap ran to a room behind the store to hide and, though he heard additional gunfire, the defendant escaped.
  • Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital, remained there from September 3 to September 12, 1949, and returned for follow-up visits at the physician’s advice; his total hospital/doctor costs amounted to P300.
  • The defendant had previously shot two other individuals, Ong Pian and Jose Sy, on the morning of September 3, 1949.
  • By September 5, information was received that the defendant was in custody in Tarlac. Captain Daniel V. Lomotan of the Manila Police proceeded to Tarlac, where the defendant admitted that his victims were Kiap, Ong Pian, and Jose Sy. The Constabulary delivered to Lomotan the pistol used (Exhibit C) and its magazine (Exhibit C-1).
  • The defendant was brought to Manila, where his written statement (Exhibit D) detailing the assaults was taken. The declaration recounted, among other things, a prior employment at Ong Pian’s restaurant, financial disputes, and resentment toward the victims after money was lost and debts were not repaid.
  • At trial, the defendant disowned Exhibit D, claiming he signed it without reading its contents and that another person (Chua Tone) had killed the three victims. He did not present witnesses to support the denial and did not deny the prior admissions before Lomotan.
  • The trial court found the defendant’s admissions credible and convicted him of the charged frustrated murder.
  • Notably, Kiap’s wounds and medical treatment, the absence of a fatal outcome, and the defendant’s escape after the shooting were critical factual elements.
  • The defense argued the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Kiap’s wound resulted from the same bullet that wounded Jose Sy, and questioned the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a frustrated murder conviction.
  • The trial court, and the Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court under section 17(4) of RA No. 296, due to the same-occasion murders.

Issues

  1. Did Kiap’s wound originate from the same bullet that wounded Jose Sy?
  2. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for frustrated murder?
  3. Should the defendant be convicted of attempted murder instead, given the evidence and the subjective phase of execution?
  4. Was the indemnity of P350 properly awarded?

Ruling

  1. No — Kiap’s wound was not shown to have been caused by the same bullet that struck Jose Sy; Kiap himself testified that after he saw the defendant shoot at Sy, the defendant turned and fired at him, indicating a separate shot.
  2. No — The evidence did not establish the complete subjective phase required for frustrated murder; the accused fired at the victim, but escaped and did not continue the pursuit after the victim fled, leaving doubt whether he believed all acts of execution were completed.
  3. Yes — The defendant is guilty of attempted murder, and the sentence should be reduced accordingly.
  4. Yes — The indemnity of P350 was properly awarded; the victim’s hospital and medical expenses supported the award.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • The court rejected the defense theory that Kiap was wounded by the same bullet aimed at Jose Sy, noting Kiap’s testimony that after the initial firing at Sy, the defendant shot Kiap in a separate act.
  • On the key issue of frustrated murder, the court relied on established precedents (U.S. v. Eduave; People v. Dagman; People v. Borinaga) that the crime is frustrated murder when the accused believes all acts necessary to kill have been performed. However, in this case the accused fired and wounded Kiap but fled, and the record shows he did not pursue to kill; thus the subjective phase of execution was not completed in the mind of the accused.
  • The court found doubt whether the defendant actually believed he had completed all acts necessary to kill; this doubt favors the defendant and leads to a conviction for attempted murder rather than frustrated murder.
  • The weight of evidence included: Kiap’s uncontradicted testimony, the admissions before Captain Lomotan, the defendant’s possession of the .45 pistol (Exhibit C) and magazine (Exhibit C-1), the written confession (Exhibit D), and medical testimony regarding non-fatal wounds.
  • The court also addressed the confession’s credibility, noting that the defendant admitted to the incidents consistent with Exhibit D and that his later denial did not overcome the corroborating admissions and physical evidence.
  • The indemnity was affirmed based on the proved medical expenses and hospital stay.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

  • Subjective phase of acts of execution: For frustrated murder, the offender must complete the acts of execution necessary to cause death and believe that he has achieved that result.
  • When the accused fires but the victim survives and escapes, and the offender does not continue to pursue or complete the act, the offense more properly fits attempted murder, per established Philippine jurisprudence (Eduave; Dagman; Borinaga).
  • Confessions and accompanying physical evidence can strongly support conviction, but credibility may be tested against other testimony; admissions before authorities carry substantial weight when corroborated.
  • Indemnity awards require evidence of actual expenses incurred by the victim; hospital and medical costs are a proper basis for such an award.

Disposition

  • The judgment of the trial court is modified: the defendant is found guilty of attempted murder, not frustrated murder.
  • Sentence: an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of prision correccional to 10 years of prision mayor.
  • Costs against the defendant.
  • The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • No separate concurrence or dissent is noted; the decision reflects the majority view of the en banc court, with Justices Paras, C.J., and others concurring.

Significance / Notes

  • This decision clarifies the application of the subjective phase doctrine in the context of multiple simultaneous assaults, reinforcing that a complete belief by the accused that all acts necessary to kill have been performed is essential for frustrated murder.
  • It illustrates the use of prior cases (Eduave, Dagman, Borinaga) to determine whether the crime should be categorized as frustrated murder or attempted murder when the victim survives and the assailant ceases further pursuit.
  • The ruling demonstrates how confessions, corroborating admissions, and physical evidence interact in weighing credibility and determining the appropriate conviction and sentence.
  • The case underscores that indemnity awards hinge on documented medical expenses and hospital stays.
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