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Maria Flor V. Dirige vs. Victoriano Biranya

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Maria Flor V. Dirige vs. Victoriano Biranya

Case Title and Citation

Maria Flor V. Dirige, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Victoriano Biranya, defendant and appellant.
G.R. No. L-22033, July 30, 1966
Supreme Court - En Banc
Ponente: Justice Sanchez

Facts

  • Forcible entry case originally dismissed by the Justice of the Peace (Municipal) Court of Del Gallego, Camarines Sur; plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Civil Case No. 4717).
  • Registered notice of the appealed case was sent and received by Ciriaco Biranya purportedly for his father, defendant Victoriano Biranya; defendant did not file an answer.
  • July 8, 1960 — Court declared defendant in default and directed plaintiff to present evidence on July 21, 1960.
  • July 21, 1960 — On plaintiff’s evidence, the trial court rendered judgment ordering defendant to vacate the premises and to pay damages, attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs; final judgment entry was made by the clerk on the same date.
  • July 25, 1960 — Plaintiff received notice of judgment.
  • February 22, 1961 — Defendant learned of the order and judgment (Sheriff served writ of execution).
  • February 24, 1961 — Defendant filed a verified petition for relief to set aside the default order and default judgment and for a new trial.
  • July 29, 1961 — Trial court denied defendant’s petition for relief on the ground that the six-month reglementary period had elapsed.
  • Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals; case was certified to the Supreme Court on questions of law.
  • Defendant asserted (in his petition and annexes) ownership of the disputed property and relied on an amicable settlement and an order of the Director of Lands; the record showed an ocular inspection indicating the area claimed by defendant was outside the disputed land and that an Original Certificate of Title for the land was issued in favor of plaintiff on November 28, 1950 (Exhibit C).

Issues

  1. May defendant be declared in default because the notice of the appealed case was sent to him and not to his lawyer?
  2. Must a petition for relief from a default order and default judgment be filed within six months from the date of the default order, from the date of judgment, from the date judgment becomes final, or from the date judgment is entered?
  3. Was the petition for relief adequately supported by affidavits showing fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence and the facts constituting defendant’s good and substantial defense as required by Rule 38?
  4. Does defendant’s asserted ownership defense, supported by annexes and the Director of Lands’ inspection, demonstrate a good and substantial defense that would justify setting aside the default judgment?

Ruling

  1. No - The claim that defendant could not be declared in default because notice was not sent to his lawyer is not availing: the point was not raised below, counsel had not entered a formal appearance to entitle him to notice, and Section 7, Rule 40 requires notice to the parties.
  2. No - A petition for relief under Rule 38 must be filed within six months from the date the judgment or order was entered by the clerk; the six-month period is computed from entry of judgment.
  3. No - The petition lacked sufficient affidavits and proof of excusable negligence and good defense; mere forgetfulness by the son without supporting proof is inadequate.
  4. No - The annexes and land-inspection evidence do not show a probable different result on retrial; record shows Torrens title issued to plaintiff and that the inspected area claimed by defendant was outside the disputed land.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • Issue 1: The Court applied the rule that a procedural complaint not raised in the lower court is waived on appeal. It noted there was no formal appearance by defendant’s counsel in the Justice of the Peace court; mere appearance at trial is insufficient to establish entitlement to notice. The Court relied on Section 7, Rule 40 (1949 Rules of Court) requiring the clerk to notify the parties by registered mail and held that the statute contemplates notice to the parties, not exclusively to counsel. Prior authorities cited include Gala v. Cui and Esquivias v. Sison regarding formal appearance and waiver principles.
  • Issue 2: The Court interpreted Section 3, Rule 38 (old and new Rules of Court) which requires filing “not more than six months after such judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken.” The Court concluded that the statutory phrase “entered” must be read literally and that entry of judgment by the clerk (recording in the book of entries and clerk’s certificate) is the fixed point from which the six-month period runs (citing Section 2, Rule 36). The Court surveyed conflicting prior cases (Isaac v. Mendoza; Gana v. Abaya; Prudential Bank & Trust Co. v. Macadaeg; Sambrano v. Reyes; Salvatierra v. Garlitos; Abao v. Virtucio; Samson v. Dinglasan; Follosco v. Tuyay; Soriano v. Asi; Delgado v. Ceniza; Quijano v. Tameta) and resolved the divergence by holding entry date controls for judgments and operations that require entry; “such proceeding was taken” applies to proceedings not entered. The Court expressly overruled inconsistent rulings and emphasized the clerk’s duty to enter judgments to avoid uncertainty. Here the clerk entered judgment on July 21, 1960; the petition filed February 24, 1961 was beyond six months.
  • Issue 3: Section 3, Rule 38 requires that a petition for relief be accompanied by affidavits showing the alleged grounds (fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence) and facts of the defense. Relief is equitable and rests on a showing of excusable negligence and a good and substantial defense. The Court held defendant failed to discharge the burden to show excusable negligence: the son’s alleged sudden illness and supposed forgetting of the registered letter were unsupported by medical proof or other corroboration; mere forgetfulness is insufficient (citing Gordulan v. Gordulan and principles discussed in Martin, Rules of Court).
  • Issue 4: On the merits, the annexes and Director of Lands’ inspection indicated the area defendant claimed was outside the disputed land; the record showed an Original Certificate of Title in favor of plaintiff dated November 28, 1950 (Exhibit C). The Court found no reasonable probability that vacating the default judgment and granting a new trial would produce a different result (citing Miranda v. Legaspi and related authorities).

Doctrine / Legal Principle

  • A petition for relief under Rule 38 must be filed within six months from the date the judgment or order is entered by the clerk; entry is the fixed point for computing the six-month period.
  • Notice by registered mail to the party is effective under Section 7, Rule 40; an attorney is entitled to notice only if he has entered a formal appearance.
  • Relief from judgment for excusable negligence is an equitable remedy granted sparingly; petitioner bears the burden of proving excusable negligence and a good and substantial defense with supporting affidavits.
  • Mere forgetfulness or unsupported assertions of inadvertence do not constitute excusable negligence sufficient to vacate a default judgment.

Disposition

  • The trial court’s July 29, 1961 order denying defendant’s verified petition for relief from the default order and default judgment is affirmed.
  • Costs are awarded against defendant.
  • The default judgment and related orders remain in effect.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • Concurrence: Concepcion, C.J.; Reyes, J.B.L.; Barrera; Dizon; Regala; Makalintal; Bengzon, J.P.; Zaldivar; and Castro, JJ., concur.
  • No dissenting opinion noted.

Significance / Notes

  • Clarifies and settles conflicting jurisprudence: the six-month reglementary period of Section 3, Rule 38 runs from the date a judgment or order is entered by the clerk, not from rendition, default order date, or date of finality.
  • Emphasizes the administrative role of the clerk in entering judgments to fix the timetables for post-judgment relief; prevailing parties and counsel should ensure entry is recorded promptly to avoid uncertainty.
  • Reinforces that notice to counsel requires formal appearance; parties who rely on counsel to receive notices should ensure counsel’s formal appearance is recorded.
  • Reaffirms strict standards for setting aside default judgments: petitioners must present affidavits and evidence of excusable negligence and a plausible defense; unsupported claims of forgetfulness are inadequate.
  • Overrules prior decisions inconsistent with the entry-date rule for the six-month period and directs lower courts to apply this rule.
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