Post

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary; Antigraft League v. Juico

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary; Antigraft League v. Juico

Case Title and Citation

Civil Liberties Union, petitioner, vs. The Executive Secretary, respondent.
G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, 1991-02-22
Supreme Court - EN BANC
Ponente: Justice Fernan

Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. and Crispin T. Reyes, petitioners, vs. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; Carlos Dominguez, as Secretary of Agriculture; Lourdes Quisumbing, as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports; Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources; Vicente V. Jayme, as Secretary of Finance; Sedfrey Ordoñez, as Secretary of Justice; Franklin N. Drilon, as Secretary of Labor and Employment; Luis Santos, as Secretary of Local Government; Fidel V. Ramos, as Secretary of National Defense; Teodoro F. Benigno, as Press Secretary; Juanito Ferrer, as Secretary of Public Works and Highways; Antonio Arrizabal, as Secretary of Science and Technology; Jose Concepcion, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; Jose Antonio Gonzalez, as Secretary of Tourism; Alfredo R.A. Bengzon, as Secretary of Health; Reinerio D. Reyes, as Secretary of Transportation and Communications; Guillermo Carague, as Commissioner of the Budget; Solita Monsod, as Head of the National Economic Development Authority, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, 1991-02-22
Supreme Court - EN BANC
Ponente: Justice Fernan


Facts

  • Executive Order No. 284, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987, allows a Cabinet member, undersecretary, or assistant secretary or other appointive official to hold not more than two positions in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations, in addition to their primary position; the order provides that the excess positions must be relinquished in favor of the next in rank, and that certain board composition rules apply.
  • The order contains a specific carve-out that for government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third of the board members must be secretaries, undersecretaries, or assistant secretaries.
  • Petitioners argued that EO 284 contravenes Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution; they contended that the Constitution already provides the exceptions for the Vice-President and the ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council, and that Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B (allowing exceptions to the general rule for appointive officials) cannot override Section 13.
  • Respondents defended EO 284, arguing that the Constitution’s phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” refers to the general exception framework in Section 7, IX-B, and that DOJ opinions (No. 73, 129, 155) and executive policy were reasonable constructions consistent with the Constitution.
  • The Court observed the historical context: the practice of Cabinet members sitting on boards of government entities proliferated during the Marcos era, raising concerns about self-enrichment and conflicts of interest, which helped shape the stricter provisions in the 1987 Constitution.
  • The Court also noted that ex-officio positions (held as part of primary functions and without additional compensation) are not “any other office” within the meaning of the prohibition, as supported by legal precedent and constitutional interpretation principles.
  • The Court held that EO 284 is unconstitutional and directed certain officials to relinquish non-primary offices. Some respondents were deemed de facto officers for purposes of emoluments during the challenged period.

Issues

  1. Does Executive Order No. 284 violate Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution by allowing Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants to hold other government positions?
  2. Does the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII refer to the broad exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B?
  3. Are ex officio positions to be treated as permissible in addition to a Cabinet member’s primary position, without violating the constitutional prohibition?

Ruling

  1. Yes — Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional for violating Section 13, Article VII, which rigidly prohibits the President, Vice-President, Cabinet members and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, except as expressly provided by the Constitution.
  2. No — The broad exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B cannot override or substitute the explicit prohibition in Section 13, Article VII; reading them together in a way that diminishes the strictness of Section 13 would render the constitutional framework ineffective.
  3. Yes — Ex officio posts, when they are required by the primary functions of a cabinet official and involve no additional compensation, are not “any other office” within the contemplation of the prohibition and are permissible when properly grounded in law and primary functions.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • The Court emphasized that the 1987 Constitution establishes a stricter prohibition for the President, Vice-President, and the Cabinet, reflecting the framers’ intent to prevent conflicts of interest and abuse of power after the Marcos era.
  • The Court analyzed the relationship between Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, concluding that Section 13 creates an absolute disqualification for the high executive officials, with explicit exceptions only when provided in the Constitution itself.
  • The interpretation reconciles provisions by treating ex officio duties as part of the primary functions and not as “other offices,” thereby avoiding absurd results (e.g., depriving high officials of necessary ex-officio roles such as chairing required bodies).
  • The Court relied on constitutional history, debates, and the principle that a provision should be read in the context of the entire instrument, giving effect to all words and avoiding renderings that would make provisions meaningless.
  • The Court quoted and considered prior interpretations and jurisprudence regarding ex officio status and primary functions, as well as the potential impracticalities and moral hazards of allowing broad, non-ex officio dual or multiple offices for senior executive officials.

  • The President, Vice-President, Cabinet members, and their deputies/assistants are subject to a stricter, absolute prohibition on holding other offices during tenure; exceptions must be found in the Constitution itself.
  • Ex officio positions held in compliance with primary functions and without additional compensation are not “any other office” under the constitutional prohibition.
  • The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII must be read narrowly to reference expressly provided constitutional exceptions, not a broad, general exemption.
  • Constitutional provisions on disqualifications should be harmonized to avoid rendering any provision idle or nugatory and should reflect the framers’ intent to prevent abuses tied to dual or multiple offices.

Disposition

  • The petitions are GRANTED.
  • Executive Order No. 284 is declared null and void and is set aside.
  • Respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Factoran, Secretary of Local Government Santos, Secretary of National Defense Ramos, Secretary of Health Bengzon, and Secretary of the Budget Carague are ordered to relinquish their other government offices or employment, including positions in government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, as defined by the decision.
  • For the other named respondents, the petitions are moot and academic, as they were no longer occupying the questioned positions; during the tenure in questioned positions, they may be considered de facto officers and are entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • The following Justices concurred with the majority: Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr.
  • Justices Sarmiento and Griño-Aquino did not participate in the decision.

Significance / Notes

  • Establishes a clarified interpretation of the 1987 Constitution’s provisions on holding multiple government positions, reinforcing the prohibition for high executive officials and marking the boundaries of permissible ex officio duties.
  • Addresses concerns arising from the Marcos era of governance by curbing multiple-board memberships and related compensation for Cabinet-level officials.
  • Provides guidance on how to treat ex officio duties versus “other offices” for purposes of constitutional compliance and salary entitlements.
  • Sets a normative standard for evaluating executive orders or policies that seek to create or expand permissible dual or multiple government roles for high-ranking officials.
This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.