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Gil Rubio vs. Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King

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Gil Rubio vs. Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King

  1. Case Title and Citation

Gil Rubio, petitioner, vs. Spouses Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King, respondents.
G.R. No. 87110, January 24, 1996
Supreme Court - Third Division
Ponente: Justice Panganiban

  1. Facts

  • On September 18, 1985 the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 10077 ordering defendant (Gil Rubio): 1. to vacate the premises and restore possession to plaintiffs; 2. to pay P12,800.00 as rental arrears (as of June 6, 1985) with legal interest; and 3. to pay 25% attorney’s fees. The order to vacate was to issue after six months from defendant’s receipt of the decision unless an appeal was perfected and supersedeas bond and deposits were filed.
  • Before petitioner perfected an appeal, private respondents sought execution; a writ of execution issued on May 22, 1986 under which a KAWAI organ was levied but not sold due to petitioner’s perfected appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
  • On December 20, 1985 the RTC affirmed the MTCC decision.
  • The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment with modification on June 23, 1988 (entry effected September 14, 1988), reducing the rental arrearages to P2,733.00 for the period February 22, 1983 to June 6, 1985.
  • On November 13, 1988 private respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Order of Demolition with the MTCC. After a hearing on December 19, 1988, the MTCC ordered defendant given thirty (30) days to remove the property, otherwise demolition would be ordered.
  • Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (filed January 4, 1989) asserting premature issuance of the December 19, 1988 order and reliance on a pending RTC decision (Civil Case No. 8983) affecting title.
  • Private respondents filed a second motion for issuance of a writ of demolition. In an order dated January 27, 1989 the MTCC denied the motion for reconsideration and granted the motion for writ of demolition.
  • A writ denominated “Writ of Demolition” was issued on February 2, 1989 and enforced on February 20, 1989, resulting in demolition of petitioner’s houses; possession was turned over to private respondents on February 21, 1989.
  • Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on March 2, 1989.
  • Separately, RTC, Misamis Oriental, Branch 25, in Civil Case No. 8983 declared private respondents buyers in bad faith and ordered cancellation of their title in favor of Maura So; that RTC decision was later affirmed on appeal by the CA (September 13, 1989) and finally by the Supreme Court (referenced as August 2, 1991) — but those judgments were not final at the time the MTCC issued the demolition order.

  1. Issues

  2. Is a writ denominated a “writ of demolition” equivalent to a writ of execution?
  3. Does filing a motion for reconsideration suspend the period to appeal the MTCC’s December 19, 1988 order?
  4. Does the pendency of, and later a final judgment in, a parallel ownership action (Civil Case No. 8983) constitute a change in the parties’ situation sufficient to suspend execution of a final and executory ejectment judgment?

  1. Ruling

  2. Yes - A writ denominated “writ of demolition” that substantially complies with the form and contents of a writ of execution under Section 8, Rule 39 is treated as a writ of execution.
  3. No - The December 19, 1988 order was interlocutory and not appealable; therefore a motion for reconsideration of that interlocutory order did not suspend any period to appeal.
  4. No - The pendency of a separate ownership action that had not attained finality at the time of execution did not justify suspension of the final and executory ejectment judgment; petitioner, not being party to that ownership action, could not rely on it to stave off execution.

  1. Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • Writ of Demolition vs. Writ of Execution:
    • The Court examined the substance over form. The writ, though labeled “Writ of Demolition,” satisfied the essential requisites of a writ of execution under Section 8, Rule 39: it was issued in the name of the Republic, identified the judgment and court of record, and commanded the sheriff to deliver possession to plaintiffs. The Rules of Court should be liberally construed to effectuate just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition (Rule 1, Sec. 2). Accordingly, no substantial right of petitioner was violated by the nomenclature.
  • Motion for Reconsideration and Suspension of Appeal Period:
    • The Court noted that only an appeal period may be suspended by a motion for reconsideration (Section 4, Rule 40). The December 19, 1988 order was interlocutory because it required parties to perform acts preliminary to final adjudication. As an interlocutory order it was not appealable; therefore there was no period to be suspended or interrupted by a reconsideration motion. The Court cited Philippine Coal Miner’s Union v. Cebu Portland Cement Co., 10 SCRA 784, to support the characterization of interlocutory orders.
  • Effect of Parallel Ownership Action on Execution:
    • The Court recognized exceptions to immediate execution of final judgments in special cases where post-judgment events render execution unjust. However, at the time the MTCC issued the order to vacate and the writ was enforced, the ownership action (Civil Case No. 8983) had not attained finality and petitioner was not a party to that case. The Court reiterated established distinctions: unlawful detainer/ejectment concerns material possession (possession de facto), whereas reconveyance or title actions concern ownership; pendency of a title action does not divest the municipal/city court of jurisdiction over possession nor bar execution of an ejectment judgment (citing Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court and De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals). The Court thus found no basis to suspend execution on account of the separate ownership litigation.
  • Additional procedural points:
    • The MTCC’s six-month grace period in the dispositive paragraph was intended as a grace for the defendant from time of receipt of the MTCC decision; that period is rendered inoperative if the defendant perfects an appeal and files supersedeas bond, thereby extending suspension through the pendency of the appeal. Here petitioner himself availed of the grace period and prolonged it by appealing; he could not later claim the grace period anew to delay execution after finality of the CA judgment.
  • Precedents and statutes cited in reasoning include Section 8, Rule 39; Section 14, Rule 39; Section 4, Rule 40, Rule 1, Sec. 2, and cases: Philippine Coal Miner’s Union v. Cebu Portland Cement Co., Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal, Limpin, Jr. v. IAC, Ang Ping v. RTC, De la Cruz v. CA, Ramirez v. Bleza, and Manuel v. Court of Appeals, among others referenced in the decision.

  1. Doctrine / Legal Principle

  • A writ’s denomination does not control if the writ substantially complies with the statutory form and requirements of a writ of execution; substance prevails over form.
  • Interlocutory orders are not appealable; a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order does not suspend any appeal period.
  • An ejectment (unlawful detainer) action addresses possession de facto and may be executed notwithstanding a separate pending action on title; a parallel ownership action does not automatically stay execution of an ejectment judgment unless the ownership action has produced a final judgment changing the parties’ situation.
  • Judicially created grace periods in a judgment may be rendered inoperative by the defendant’s subsequent appeal and filing of supersedeas bond.

  1. Disposition

  • The petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.
  • Costs are taxed against petitioner.
  • Effect: the MTCC orders, the Writ of Demolition issued February 2, 1989, and its enforcement (demolition and turnover of possession) were upheld.

  1. Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • Justice Davide, Jr. filed a concurring opinion, emphasizing that the petition was a dilatory recourse filed after demolition and turnover of possession, rendering the issues largely moot; no dissenting opinion noted.

  1. Significance / Notes

  • Clarifies that courts will look to the substance and compliance with execution requirements rather than the label given to enforcement writs.
  • Reinforces the finality and enforceability of ejectment judgments: possession may be restored under execution even when title disputes are pending elsewhere, protecting the procedural efficacy of possession remedies.
  • Reiterates that interlocutory orders do not trigger appeal periods and that motions for reconsideration of such orders do not toll appellate deadlines.
  • Demonstrates that a litigant cannot prolong execution indefinitely by invoking procedural devices after having previously availed of grace periods and appeals.
  • Practical implication for practitioners: to delay execution legitimately, parties must raise appropriate stay mechanisms before finality and ensure they are parties to any ownership proceedings relied upon to justify suspension.
Remedial Law Civil Procedure Property Law
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