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Tañada v. Angara

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Tañada v. Angara

Case Title and Citation

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners,
vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 118295, 1997-05-02
Supreme Court - En Banc
Ponente: Chief Justice Narvasa
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Facts

  • The World Trade Organization (WTO) emerged on January 1, 1995, promoting world trade liberalization, globalization, deregulation, and privatization, with disputes settled through WTO framework rather than unilateral action.
  • The Philippines joined WTO as a founding member, with the President hopeful that accession would enhance access to foreign markets and attract investment.
  • On April 15, 1994, Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, signed in Marrakesh the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round, agreeing to submit the WTO Agreement for Senate concurrence and to adopt Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
  • On August 11, 1994, the President sent letters to the Senate informing that the Uruguay Round Final Act, the WTO Agreement, and related instruments were submitted for Senate concurrence.
  • On August 12 and August 13, 1994, the Senate received the President’s letters regarding submission for concurrence.
  • On December 9, 1994, the President certified the immediate adoption of PS 1083 concurring in ratification of the WTO.
  • On December 14, 1994, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 concurring in the President’s ratification of the WTO Agreement.
  • On December 16, 1994, the President signed the Instrument of Ratification for the WTO Agreement; the Final Act and related instruments were incorporated as integral parts of the Agreement.
  • The Final Act included the WTO Agreement, Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services; petitioners filed this petition on December 29, 1994.
  • The Court sought supplementary materials, including a Bautista Paper by the Philippine Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, summarizing background and WTO instruments; oral arguments occurred on August 27, 1996.
  • The petition raises multiple constitutional and sovereignty-based challenges to the WTO Agreement and the Senate concurrence, including questions of justiciability, self-executing nature of constitutional provisions, and potential impairment of legislative and judicial powers.
  • The Court ultimately determined it had jurisdiction to adjudicate grave abuse of discretion and proceeded to address the issues; the petition was ultimately dismissed for lack of merit on May 2, 1997.

Issues

  1. Does the petition present a justiciable controversy?
  2. Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its annexes contravene Sec. 19, Art. II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution?
  3. Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement unduly limit, restrict, or impair the legislative power of Congress?
  4. Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement unduly impair or interfere with the exercise of judicial power?
  5. Was the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes sufficient and/or valid, considering that it did not include the Final Act, Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services?

Ruling

  1. Yes — The petition presents a justiciable controversy, as it involves potential grave abuse of discretion by a legislative act affecting constitutional rights and national sovereignty.
  2. No — The provisions, read in context with constitutional principles and international law, do not contravene the specified constitutional provisions.
  3. No — The WTO provisions do not unduly restrict or impair the legislative power; international obligations may constrain sovereignty but are consistent with constitutional structure.
  4. No — The provisions do not unduly impair or interfere with the judiciary’s power to promulgate rules of procedure and apply the law.
  5. Yes — The Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement was valid and the petition was properly dismissed for lack of merit.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • Jurisdiction and justiciability: The Court held that a petition challenging legislative action that allegedly violates the Constitution presents a justiciable controversy and falls within the judiciary’s power to review grave abuse of discretion, as mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
  • Declaration of Principles not self-executing: Article II’s Declaration of Principles is not self-executing and serves as a guideline for legislation, not a freestanding enforceable right; implementing measures are required to effect constitutional principles.
  • Economic nationalism and balancing provisions: While the Constitution mandates Filipino control and preference for Filipino labor and domestic materials, the Court recognized a balanced approach, allowing international cooperation under principles of equality and reciprocity and acknowledging the WTO’s protections for developing countries.
  • Sovereignty and international obligations: Sovereignty is not absolute; international treaties limit state sovereignty, and the Philippines’ international obligations, including WTO obligations, are part of the law of the land under incorporation and prevailing over conflicting obligations, with due consideration of the public welfare.
  • TRIPS and evidence rules: The TRIPS provisions do not compel an impracticable or unconstitutional evidentiary framework; the jurisprudence recognizes reciprocity and adaptability in implementing international obligations within the domestic system.
  • Final Act vs WTO Agreement: The Court recognized that the submission authority primarily concerns the WTO Agreement and its annexes, and the Senate’s concurrence in the WTO Agreement, as the operative instrument, was sufficient under the constitution and Final Act context.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

  • Judicial review and grave abuse of discretion: The judiciary can review acts of the legislative branch for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
  • Non-self-executing declarations: General principles in constitutional declarations require implementing legislation to become judicially enforceable.
  • International agreements and sovereignty: States may constrain sovereignty through international law, including WTO/GATT obligations, when reciprocal benefits justify the concessions.
  • Balance in economic nationalism: Constitutional mandates for national economy and Filipino priority can be balanced against global trade obligations through equality and reciprocity.
  • Substantive interpretation of instruments: The WTO Agreement and its annexes are integral parts of the Uruguay Round outcomes, and Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement suffices to bind the Republic.

Disposition

  • The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
  • The Senate’s concurrence in the WTO Agreement is upheld; the action seeks to annul or restrain the WTO-related ratification and associated instruments, which the Court rejected.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • The decision was joined by Narvasa, C.J.; Regalado, Davide, Jr.; Romero; Bellosillo; Melo; Puno; Kapunan; Mendoza; Francisco; Hermosisima, Jr.; Torres, Jr., JJ., concurring.
  • Padilla and Vitug, JJ., concur in the result.

Significance / Notes

  • Clarifies judicial scope to review constitutional challenges to international treaties and related executive actions, reaffirming the Court’s role in upholding constitutional sovereignty while recognizing the legitimacy of international commitments.
  • Establishes that constitutional principles are not automatically self-executing and require legislative construction and implementing measures to become enforceable.
  • Emphasizes that sovereignty can be limited by international obligations so long as there is a constitutional framework for balancing national interests with global commitments.
  • Affirms that participation in global trade regimes, including mechanisms for dispute resolution, can be consistent with national development goals and consumer welfare when evaluated under constitutional constraints.
  • Demonstrates the Philippines’ approach to balancing “economic nationalism” with reciprocity, and the view that isolationist policies are not mandated by the Constitution.
WTO Constitutional Law Judicial Power
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