Francisco L. Jison vs. Court of Appeals and Monina Jison

Posted Feb 24, 1998

By Anonymous

6 min read

Case Title and Citation

Francisco L. Jison, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Monina Jison, respondents.
G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998
Supreme Court - First Division
Ponente: Justice Davide, Jr.

Facts

Plaintiff Monina Jison alleged she was born on August 6, 1946 in Dingle, Iloilo to Esperanza “Pansay” Amolar and petitioner Francisco Jison. Monina’s complaint for recognition as an illegitimate child was filed March 13, 1985.
Monina asserted continuous, implied recognition by Francisco and his family: payment of school fees and allowances, payment of hospitalization and funeral expenses, use of Francisco’s residences, telephone calls charged to Francisco, recommendation and facilitation of employment, and social acceptance by relatives (including Lopez family members).
Francisco denied sexual relations with Esperanza during the alleged period, denied recognizing Monina, and claimed Esperanza had ceased employment in October 1944. He pleaded estoppel, laches, prescription and sought dismissal and damages for malicious suit.
Key documentary and testimonial evidence for Monina included: school records listing Francisco as guardian, baptismal and local civil registrar certificates (with name discrepancies), photographs, PLDT long-distance toll cards, a notarized affidavit executed by Monina on September 20/21, 1971 disavowing paternity accompanied by a P15,000 check, and testimony of numerous household and office employees recounting payments, allowances and acknowledgments.
Trial court (decision November 12, 1990) dismissed Monina’s complaint, finding impossibility of intercourse at alleged time, discounting witnesses as hearsay/self-serving, and holding Monina estopped by her 1971 affidavit.
Court of Appeals (decision April 27, 1995) reversed, finding overwhelming evidence of filiation by continuous and public manifestations of paternal recognition; declared Monina the illegitimate daughter of Francisco.
Petitioner Francisco filed a Rule 45 petition to the Supreme Court contesting factual findings, admissibility and weight of documentary evidence, interpretation of the 1971 affidavit, and laches.

Issues

Did Francisco Jison have sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946?
Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco by his acts and those of his family?
Is Monina Jison barred from prosecuting the action by estoppel, laches or prescription?
Does Monina’s September 1971 sworn affidavit disclaiming paternity (Exh. P) bar her claim?
Are the birth, baptismal and school records and private letters of relatives admissible and sufficient to prove filiation?
Did the trial court correctly assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence?

Ruling

Yes - The Court found sexual contact at the relevant time possible and accepted testimony showing conception occurred while the mother was in petitioner’s employ.
Yes - The Court held that Monina established illegitimate filiation by continuous, public and consistent manifestations of parental recognition.
No - Prescription did not apply; laches and estoppel were not proven to bar the action under the circumstances.
No - The 1971 affidavit did not conclusively bar the claim; Monina produced credible explanations that she signed under pressure and for financial necessity and showed circumstances undermining its probative effect.
No/Partly - Birth, baptismal and school records and private letters are not by themselves competent to prove paternity where the putative father did not participate in their preparation; however, such documents may be received as corroborative of testimonial evidence when admitted as part of a witness’s testimony.
No - The trial court’s adverse credibility findings were reversed because it overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated material facts and because the judge who rendered the decision did not hear many witnesses.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

Governing law: Family Code Articles 172 and 175: illegitimate filiation may be proved by the same modes as legitimate filiation; where primary proofs are absent, proof may be by open and continuous possession of the status of a child or other means allowed by law.
Standard of proof: Establishing illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph requires a high standard—clear and convincing evidence of continuous, public, and consistent manifestations of parental affection and recognition (citing Baluyot v. Baluyot and related doctrine).
Burden shifting: Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case; once done, the burden shifts to defendant to rebut. The Court found Monina met and exceeded the required showing; Francisco’s denials were vague and uncorroborated.
Admissibility of documents: Certificates of live birth, baptismal records and school records are incompetent by themselves to prove paternity when the putative father did not participate in their preparation (citing Fernandez v. Court of Appeals; Reyes v. Court of Appeals; Bañas v. Bañas). Such documents, however, may be admitted as corroborative of testimonial assertions when properly offered as part of the witness’s testimony.
Family reputation evidence: Private letters or notes from relatives (Exhs. S–V) are not admissible under Rule 130, Sections 39–41 as substantive proof unless they qualify as family possessions or the authors testify; still, such documents may support a witness’s testimony when admitted as part of that testimony.
Affidavit (Exh. P): A notarized renunciation is not invincible; it may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that it was signed under compulsion, inducement or misrepresentation. The Court accepted Monina’s explanation and factual circumstances (timing of resignation from employment and events surrounding the affidavit) that undermined its conclusiveness.
Laches and estoppel: As equitable defenses, the party asserting them must prove all elements, including prejudice; petitioner failed to show that recognition or relief would be inequitable or that he suffered prejudice sufficient to invoke laches or estoppel in light of statutory rights to assert filiation.
Exceptions to deference to trial court credibility findings: The Court applied exceptions where the judge who rendered judgment did not hear key witnesses and where the trial court overlooked material facts (citing Geagonia v. Court of Appeals and related jurisprudence), justifying reexamination of facts.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

Illegitimate filiation may be established by open and continuous possession of the status of child or by other admissible means; proof requires clear and convincing evidence of continuous, public manifestations of recognition.
Birth, baptismal and school records listing a putative father are not conclusive proof of paternity when the father did not supply information to the registrar or issuing authority.
Private letters and notes of relatives do not constitute admissible family-reputation evidence unless they are family possessions or their authors testify; they may, however, corroborate testimonial assertions when admitted as part of testimony.
A notarized statement disclaiming paternity may be rebutted by credible evidence showing compulsion, inducement, or other circumstances undermining voluntariness.
Laches and estoppel as affirmative defenses require proof of all elements, including prejudice; delay alone is insufficient to defeat a statutory cause of action.

Disposition

The petition for review is DENIED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 27, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860 is AFFIRMED: respondent Monina Jison is declared the illegitimate daughter of petitioner Francisco Jison.
Costs awarded against petitioner.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

No dissent; Justices Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing concurred.

Significance / Notes

Clarifies the quantum of proof for illegitimate filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code: clear and convincing evidence via open and continuous possession of status suffices when primary documentary proof is absent.
Confirms limitations on the probative value of birth, baptismal and school records to prove paternity where the putative father did not participate in their creation.
Affirms that notarized renunciations of filiation are rebuttable by credible proof of duress, inducement or surrounding circumstances.
Reiterates that laches and estoppel require proof of prejudice and cannot be invoked solely on delay when statutory remedies remain available.
Demonstrates circumstances in which the Supreme Court may reexamine factual findings on appeal: change of trial judge and misappreciation or overlooking of material evidence.

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