Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Traders Royal Bank

Posted Jan 18, 2000

By Anonymous

6 min read

Case Title and Citation

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents.
G.R. No. 129846, January 18, 2000
Supreme Court - Second Division
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.

Facts

In January 1986 the Office of the President issued four type “B” Treasury Warrants drawn against the Bureau of Treasury totaling P151,645,000.00. The particulars were:
1. TW No. B05529511, Payee Leonila Sioson, January 6, 1986, P33,044,000.00
2. TW No. B05529512, Payee Leonila Sioson, January 6, 1986, P17,800,250.00
3. TW No. B05529515, Payee Nancy Concepcion, January 11, 1986, P39,900,250.00
4. TW No. B05529526, Payee Nancy Concepcion, January 11, 1986, P40,900,500.00
The warrants were deposited in private respondent Traders Royal Bank for collection. On January 7, 1986, Traders Royal Bank presented the warrants to the Bureau of Treasury for clearing; the warrants were cleared and amounts credited to the designated payees’ accounts.
On April 3, 1986, the Bureau of Treasury discovered that the payees’ indorsements on the warrants had been forged. The Bureau (petitioner) demanded reimbursement from Traders Royal Bank, which refused.
On October 13, 1987, petitioner (through the Bureau of Treasury) filed Civil Case No. 87-42752 for collection against Traders Royal Bank before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Manila.
During trial, after petitioner rested, Traders Royal Bank filed a Demurrer to Evidence on January 12, 1994; the RTC initially denied the demurrer on September 30, 1994, but on reconsideration granted Traders’ motion and dismissed petitioner’s complaint on January 30, 1995.
Petitioner received the dismissal order on February 7, 1995; the 15-day period to appeal expired February 22, 1995. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on February 20, 1995 (interrupting the appeal period). The RTC denied reconsideration on May 23, 1995; petitioner received that order on June 2, 1995 and thus had until June 4, 1995 to file a notice of appeal.
Petitioner filed its notice of appeal on June 16, 1995 — twelve days after the 15-day reglementary period — rendering the dismissal final.
The records were nonetheless elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA). When Traders Royal Bank later sought an extension to file its brief, it instead moved to dismiss petitioner’s appeal as untimely; the CA granted the motion and dismissed the appeal (resolution dated March 17, 1997). Petitioner moved for reconsideration before the CA; the CA denied it (May 20, 1997).
Petitioner received the CA’s denial of its motion for reconsideration on June 5, 1997 and had until June 20, 1997 to file a petition for review under Rule 45. Instead, petitioner filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari on August 4, 1997, challenging the CA’s dismissal for untimeliness.

Issues

Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s appeal as filed out of time?
May petitioner invoke certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the CA’s resolution when an appeal under Rule 45 was available?
Should the reglementary periods for filing appeals be relaxed in this case for reasons of substantial justice or because petitioner is represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)?
Is the notice of appeal sufficient where it refers only to the order denying reconsideration and not to the order dismissing the complaint?

Ruling

No - The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse in dismissing the appeal as untimely; perfection of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.
No - Certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal when an appeal under Rule 45 is available.
No - The rules on reglementary periods will not be relaxed absent exceptional, meritorious circumstances; none were shown, and the OSG’s caseload is not a sufficient excuse.
No - The notice of appeal was defective because it referred only to the order denying reconsideration, which is interlocutory and not appealable; failure to appeal from the final order is fatal.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

Certiorari (Rule 65) lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; it is not a substitute for an appeal (citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 423 (1997)). Petitioner had an available remedy under Rule 45 but failed to use it within the reglementary period.
This Court may, in limited and exceptional cases, relax the rules governing reglementary periods for appeals (citing Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., 230 SCRA 9 (1994) and related jurisprudence), but the exception requires truly exceptional facts. Examples where the Court has excused short delays involved death of counsel, threatened grave injustice, or pre-existing finality of related litigation. Petitioner did not demonstrate such circumstances.
Timeliness in perfecting appeals is jurisdictional; failure to comply deprives appellate courts of jurisdiction and renders the trial court’s decision final and executory (citing Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373 (1996) and authorities).
The Office of the Solicitor General’s burden or caseload is an insufficient justification for failure to meet deadlines; counsel must manage deadlines (citing Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 50 (1996)).
Rule 37 §9 and Rule 41 §1(a) (Rules of Court) codify the settled rule that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is interlocutory and not appealable; the proper appeal is from the final judgment or order. Petitioner’s notice of appeal referred only to the denial of reconsideration and not to the dismissal order, which is a fatal defect (citing cases listed in the opinion).

Doctrine / Legal Principle

Certiorari under Rule 65 is unavailable where an ordinary appeal under Rule 45 exists; certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal.
Perfection of appeals within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to perfect appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction and renders the trial court’s decision final.
Relaxation of procedural rules on timeliness is exceptional and requires proof of extraordinary circumstances.
An order denying a motion for reconsideration is interlocutory and not appealable; notices of appeal must address the final judgment or order.

Disposition

The petition is DISMISSED.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint became final and executory as a result of petitioner’s failure to perfect timely appeals. The Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the appeal was proper and is sustained.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

The decision was authored by MENDOZA, J.
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.
(The Court of Appeals resolution that was reviewed was per Justice Romeo A. Brawner, concurred in by Justices Emeritio C. Cui and Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros — noted in the record of the lower court’s resolution.)

Significance / Notes

Reinforces the strict, jurisdictional nature of reglementary periods for appeals: litigants must perfect appeals within prescribed time or lose the right to appellate review.
Confirms the limited scope of Rule 65 certiorari: where ordinary remedies exist, certiorari is unavailable.
Places on counsel, including the OSG, the obligation to monitor and comply with filing deadlines; caseload alone does not excuse late filings.
Emphasizes that notices of appeal must clearly appeal from final judgments or orders; referencing only denial of reconsideration is insufficient.
Practical effect: petitions challenging procedural dismissals must ordinarily be pursued by timely appeal under Rule 45; failure to do so results in finality of trial court judgments.

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