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Miguel Soriano, Jr. and Julieta Soriano vs. Antero Soriano and Virginia Soriano

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Miguel Soriano, Jr. and Julieta Soriano vs. Antero Soriano and Virginia Soriano

Case Title and Citation

Miguel Soriano, Jr. and Julieta Soriano, petitioners, vs. Antero Soriano and Virginia Soriano, respondents.
G.R. No. 130348, September 3, 2007
Supreme Court - Third Division
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts

  • On October 5, 1981, respondents Antero and Virginia Soriano (lessors) and petitioners Miguel Soriano, Jr. and Julieta Soriano (lessees) executed a 20-year lease over a 420-square-meter lot at Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila (TCT No. S33221). The lease prohibited sublease or assignment without written consent of the lessors.
  • In December 1993 respondents discovered that portions of the leased premises were occupied by third-party businesses (beauty parlor, photography shop, auto supply, money changer) and alleged petitioners had subleased the premises without consent.
  • On February 24, 1994, respondents filed a Complaint for Ejectment in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 79, Las Piñas (Civil Case No. 3856), seeking possession, monthly rentals (P2,662.00 from January 1994 until vacancy) and attorney’s fees (P10,000).
  • Petitioners denied subleasing and maintained arrangements with third parties were joint venture agreements; they contested the authenticity of a purported July 3, 1993 contract of lease between petitioners and Marilou P. Del Castillo, alleging forgery of witnesses’ and notary’s signatures.
  • Petitioners also filed a consignation action (Civil Case No. 94-0001) claiming they tendered rental checks for January–June 1994 which respondents refused to cash; the MeTC consolidated the cases.
  • Evidence offered by respondents included: a copy of the July 3, 1993 contract of lease, affidavits of Marilou P. Del Castillo and other third parties, and an NBI questioned-document report indicating forgery of Del Castillo’s signature on the Joint Venture Agreement.
  • On April 15, 1996, the MeTC issued a joint decision in favor of respondents ordering possession returned to respondents, monthly rentals from January 1994, and attorney’s fees; the consignation action and counterclaim were dismissed.
  • The MeTC found the agreement between petitioners and Del Castillo was a sublease and relied on Del Castillo’s affidavit and the NBI report indicating forgery of the Joint Venture Agreement.
  • The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 255, Las Piñas, affirmed the MeTC decision on April 3, 1997.
  • Petitioners moved for reconsideration (filed April 17, 1997); the RTC denied the motion on May 6, 1997 (copies received by petitioners and counsel on May 28 and June 2, 1997 respectively).
  • Petitioners filed a motion for extension of time and thereafter a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 44365) on June 6, 1997. The Court of Appeals denied the petition on August 18, 1997, on grounds of lateness and on the merits; petitioners sought relief in the Supreme Court by Rule 45 petition.

Issues

  1. Was the petition for review before the Court of Appeals filed out of time because the RTC’s order denying reconsideration was served upon petitioner Atty. Miguel Soriano personally (May 28, 1997) rather than upon petitioners’ counsel of record Rico & Associates Law Office (June 2, 1997)?
  2. Did the Court of Appeals err in accepting as valid the July 3, 1993 contract of lease between petitioners and Marilou P. Del Castillo despite evidence of forged signatures on witnesses and notary attestations?
  3. Did the Court of Appeals disregard clear and convincing evidence that the agreement between petitioners and Del Castillo was a joint venture and not a sublease, thereby failing to find no violation of the original lease?

Ruling

  1. No - the petition was timely filed; service upon petitioners’ counsel of record (Rico & Associates Law Office) on June 2, 1997 triggered the remaining five-day period and the petition filed June 6, 1997 was within time.
  2. No - the Court of Appeals did not err; forged attestations of witnesses or notary do not negate the existence of a contract when the contracting parties’ consents are established.
  3. No - the Supreme Court will not disturb the factual determinations of three lower courts absent recognized exceptions; none of those exceptions were present.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • Procedural timeliness:
    • Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs service: where a party has appeared by counsel, service shall be made upon counsel of record unless the court orders service upon the party.
    • Notices required to be given in a court of record must be sent to counsel of record at the address of record; service on any other person does not start reglementary periods in place of service on counsel of record (citing Gundayao v. Court of Appeals and other authorities cited in the record).
    • Rico & Associates Law Office was the formal counsel of record for petitioners; the order denying reconsideration was received by that law firm on June 2, 1997, thereby starting the remaining five-day period for filing the petition; petition filed on June 6, 1997 was timely.
    • The rules of procedure should be applied to secure substantial justice; a strict reading that treats personal receipt by a collaborating counsel as substituted service on counsel of record would contravene Rule 13.
  • Substantive contract/factual findings:
    • Under Rule 45, the Supreme Court’s review is limited to questions of law; findings of fact by the trial court, as affirmed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are binding unless one of the recognized exceptions to non-disturbance of facts exists (e.g., conclusions based on conjecture; grave abuse of discretion; conflict of findings; findings unsupported by evidence).
    • The courts below found that Del Castillo acknowledged signing the lease and that petitioner Julieta Soriano also signed; the forgery was limited to witnesses’ and notary’s signatures, which affect third-party enforceability but do not negate the parties’ consent necessary for contract formation.
    • Petitioners did not prove the signatures of the contracting parties themselves were forged; absence of proof that the parties’ signatures were forged meant consent was established and a valid sublease existed, violating the prohibition on sublease in the original lease.
    • None of the exceptions justifying re-evaluation of factual findings by the Supreme Court were present; hence the appellate factual conclusions stand.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

  • Service of court processes under Rule 13: when a party is represented by counsel, service upon the counsel of record is the legally effective service that starts reglementary periods.
  • Under Rule 45, the Supreme Court reviews only questions of law; findings of fact by lower courts are binding except under narrow, recognized exceptions.
  • Forged attestations of witnesses or notarial attestations do not, by themselves, invalidate a contract if the mutual consent of the contracting parties is established.
  • Substantial justice may justify pragmatic application of procedural rules to prevent forfeiture of substantive rights by technicality.

Disposition

  • The petition is DENIED.
  • The August 18, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44365 is AFFIRMED.
  • Costs are taxed against petitioners.
  • The MeTC and RTC judgments ordering ejectment and payment of monthly rentals and attorney’s fees were effectively upheld by affirmation.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • Justices Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura, and Reyes concurred. No dissenting opinion noted.

Significance / Notes

  • Confirms that service upon counsel of record (and the date counsel receives notice) governs computation of appeal periods; parties cannot rely on receipt by another attorney or personal receipt by a collaborating counsel to interrupt or alter reglementary timing.
  • Reinforces the limited scope of the Supreme Court’s review under Rule 45 and the high threshold required to overturn factual findings of lower courts.
  • Clarifies that defects in witnesses’ or notarial attestations do not automatically void a contract where the contracting parties’ signatures and consent are present; such defects primarily affect third-party enforceability.
  • Practical outcome: defendants (petitioners) were ordered to vacate premises, pay monthly rentals from January 1994, and pay attorney’s fees as earlier adjudicated by the lower courts; consignation claim was dismissed by the MeTC and that dismissal was affirmed.
Civil Procedure Property Law Obligations and Contracts
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