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North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel - MOA-AD (Consolidated) - En Banc

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North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel - MOA-AD (Consolidated) - En Banc

Case Title and Citation

G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, 183962, October 14, 2008
Supreme Court - En Banc
Ponente: Justice Carpio Morales

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents. x——————————————–x

G.R. No. 183752 October 14, 2008
CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, City Mayor of Zamboanga, and in his personal capacity as resident of the City of Zamboanga, Rep. MA. ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, District 2, City of Zamboanga, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO C. GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, respondents. x——————————————–x

G.R. No. 183893 October 14, 2008
THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE LLUCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and duly appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary. respondents. x——————————————–x

G.R. No. 183951 October 14, 2008
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his capacity as Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman, 1st Congressional District, HON. CESAR G. JALOSJOS, Congressman, 3rd Congressional District, and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del Norte, namely, HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO M. MEJORADA II, HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO, HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S. DARUNDAY, HON. ANGELICA J. CARREON and HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON. RODOLFO C. GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser of Peace Process, respondents. x——————————————–x

G.R. No. 183962 October 14, 2008
ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C. GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents. x——————————————–x

FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention. x——————————————–x SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioners-in-intervention. x——————————————–x MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N. DEANO, petitioners-in-intervention, x——————————————–x THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-AKBAR, petitioners-in-intervention. x——————————————–x THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU, in his capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention. x——————————————-x RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao Not Belonging to the MILF, petitioner-in-intervention. x——————————————–x CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan, petitioners-in-intervention. x——————————————–x MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention. x——————————————–x MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC (MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention. x——————————————–x MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention. x——————————————–x

CARPIO MORALES, J.: Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. The Court herein addresses the constitutional boundaries applicable to the GRP-MILF peace negotiations and the proper scope of judicial review. The petitions challenge the MOA-AD on both procedural and substantive grounds, including public disclosure, consultation, and compatibility with the Constitution and laws.

Facts

  • August 5, 2008: GRP and MILF planned to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, as part of the Tripoli Agreement framework.
  • July 23, 2008: Petition by the Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) for Mandamus and Prohibition seeking disclosure of the MOA-AD and to prohibit signing, including a public consultation. Similar petitions followed from other LGUs (G.R. Nos. 183752, 183893, 183951, 183962) and interventions.
  • August 4, 2008: Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) commanding respondents to cease from signing the MOA-AD; official copies of the MOA-AD were requested and later provided.
  • MOA-AD overview: Terms of Reference include four strands—Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, Governance—along with references to ARMM, IPRA, and international law instruments. It defines Bangsamoro as a people, describes the Bangsamoro homeland, and contemplates a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) with jurisdiction over internal and territorial waters, natural resources, and governance structures.
  • The MOA-AD would (a) vest significant territorial and governance powers in the BJE (an associative arrangement with the Central Government), (b) require plebiscites for certain areas (Categories A and B), and (c) provide for amendments to the legal framework through a Comprehensive Compact and to take effect upon certain changes to the constitutional and legal framework.
  • The MOA-AD’s stance on external relations, defense, resource sharing, and governance raised questions about compatibility with the 1987 Constitution, ARMM Organic Act (R.A. 6734 as amended by R.A. 9054), IPRA (R.A. 8371), and Local Government Code (R.A. 7160).
  • The petitions asserted violations of: (i) the right to information and public consultation (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7; Art. II, Sec. 28), (ii) public policy on disclosure and the need for consultation under E.O. 3 (2001) and LGC requirements; and (iii) constitutional and statutory limits on the President’s power to negotiate and bind the government in peace talks.
  • The Court found: (a) the MOA-AD and its provisions confront constitutional limits, (b) the signing and binding commitments could amount to constitutional amendments or extraordinary authority that cannot be guaranteed by the Executive alone, and (c) the MOA-AD’s structure (associative relationship with a Bangsamoro juridical entity) is incompatible with the present constitutional framework.

Issues

  1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic (mandamus and prohibition aspects) in light of MOA-AD disclosures and the government’s stance on signing.
  2. Whether the constitutionality and legality of the MOA-AD is ripe for adjudication.
  3. Whether the GRP Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in negotiating and initiating the MOA-AD.
  4. Whether there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern and the State policy of full disclosure, including the Local Government Code’s consultation requirements; and whether Rule 65 is an appropriate remedy.
  5. Whether signing the MOA-AD would bind the Government to an associative Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and require constitutional amendments or changes to the IPRA and other laws; and whether the President has authority to bind the Government in such a manner.
  6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of certain localities (e.g., Cotabato, Zamboanga, Iligan, Isabela, Linamon) is justiciable.
  7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA-AD derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government.

Ruling

  1. No — The petitions are not moot. The MOA-AD is part of a broader peace process, with potential ongoing implications, and the government’s actions could recur in future negotiations.
  2. Yes — The questions presented are ripe for adjudication, given the constitutional and legal stakes and the challenges to the MOA-AD’s framework.
  3. Yes — The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion by failing to carry out required consultations and overstepping authority.
  4. Yes — There was a violation of the right to information and public consultation; the MOA-AD and related processes did not comply with the Constitution, E.O. 3, the Local Government Code, or IPRA; executive privilege cannot excuse these failures.
  5. Yes — The MOA-AD’s contents create an associative relationship with a Bangsamoro entity that, as drafted, would require constitutional amendments and would conflict with the IPRA and other laws; the MOA-AD’s suspensive clause and guaranteed amendments are unconstitutional.
  6. Yes — The questions regarding inclusion/exclusion of specific areas are justiciable given their potential impact on sovereignty and territorial integrity.
  7. Yes — The MOA-AD’s desistance or non-signing cannot automatically cure the constitutional violations; the Court invalidated the MOA-AD as a whole.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • The right to information and public consultation is central to constitutional democracy. The MOA-AD’s disclosure and the process leading to signing violated the Constitution’s information-right (Art. III, Sec. 7) and the policy of full public disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28). The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, and the public has a right to participate in and be informed of steps leading to such commitments, including negotiations and potential contracts.
  • E.O. No. 3 establishes a comprehensive peace process with required continuing consultations, dialogues, and feedback mechanisms with civil society and local governments. The PAPP’s conduct contravened these mandates, constituting grave abuse of discretion.
  • The MOA-AD’s framework envisions an associative relationship between the Central Government and a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The Court found that, under the Constitution, there is no provision for an associative entity with state-like powers or for a separate “Bangsamoro homeland” that could operate outside the constitutional framework without constitutional amendments. The MOA-AD’s Territory, Resources, and Governance strands contemplated a status akin to a state, incompatible with Article X and with autonomous regions as defined by the Constitution.
  • The MOA-AD’s attempt to require amendments to the legal framework (including the Constitution) upon signing a Comprehensive Compact was analyzed and rejected as unconstitutional, since the President cannot guarantee constitutional amendments or bind the people to changes beyond proper constitutional processes. The precedents cited include Sanlakas v. Reyes, Lambino v. COMELEC, and Marcos v. Manglapus, among others, illustrating that presidential power to propose constitutional amendments must proceed through proper channels and not by unilateral guarantees.
  • International law references (e.g., UN DRIP) were discussed to contextualize indigenous rights, but the Court held that even if DRIP is part of the law, it does not compel the MOA-AD’s provisions, especially where they conflict with the Constitution and national statutes.
  • Jurisdictional and mootness considerations were analyzed, including exceptions allowing courts to hear cases capable of repetition yet evading review and those involving grave constitutional questions. The MOA-AD’s ongoing implications outweighed mootness conclusions, warranting review on the merits.
  • The Court concluded that the MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present constitutional and legal framework and is void for lack of proper authority, process, and constitutional compliance.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

  • Right to information on matters of public concern is a self-executory constitutional right; state disclosure policies (Art. II, Sec. 28) complement the right to information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
  • Executive orders establishing peace processes must be implemented with ongoing, meaningful public consultation and civil society participation; executive privilege cannot justify withholding legally required consultations.
  • The President’s power to negotiate peace does not include the authority to bind the government to constitutional amendments or alter national sovereignty or territorial integrity without proper constitutional processes (Congress, constitutional convention, or plebiscite).
  • International law principles (e.g., DRIP) do not automatically override the Constitution or authorize a state to unilaterally cede or reconfigure sovereignty or territorial arrangements.
  • The MOA-AD’s concept of an associative Bangsamoro entity and the automatic inclusion of areas in the Bangsamoro Homeland raise constitutional concerns about territorial subdivisions, autonomy, and the nature of state sovereignty.

Disposition

  • The main and intervening petitions are granted.
  • The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
  • The MOA-AD cannot take effect and its provisions inconsistent with the Constitution and laws are unenforceable.
  • The Court denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss; the petitions proceed on the merits, and the MOA-AD is void.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • Separate Concurring Opinion: Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, with Justices Ynares-Santiago and Carpio.
  • Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Leonardo-de Castro and Justice Brion.
  • Separate Opinion: Justices Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Reyes.
  • Dissenting Opinion: Justices Velasco, Jr. and Nachura.

Significance / Notes

  • The decision reaffirms that constitutional boundaries govern the peace process, especially where negotiations implicate territorial integrity, autonomy, and indigenous rights.
  • It underscores the necessity of transparent, participatory processes—especially with local governments and ICCs/IPs—when negotiating arrangements that affect sovereignty and territorial claims.
  • It rejects the notion that executive negotiation can foreclose or guarantee constitutional amendments or binding commitments outside proper constitutional channels.
  • The MOA-AD’s rejection clarifies that any future peace framework must operate within the framework of existing constitutional provisions or proceed through the constitutional amendment process, with robust public participation and compliance with IPRA and LGU consultation requirements.
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