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Mosqueda v. PBGEA

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Mosqueda v. PBGEA

Case Title and Citation

Wilfredo Mosqueda, Marcelo Villaganes, Julieta Lawagon, Crispin Alcomendras, Corazon Sabinada, Virginia Cata-Ag, Florencia Sabandon, and Ledivina Adlawan, petitioners,
vs. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., Davao Fruits Corporation, and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation, respondents.
G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
Supreme Court - Manila En Banc
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
G.R. No. 189305 (City of Davao v. Court of Appeals, et al.) is consolidated with the above.

Facts

  • The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07 (Series of 2007), banning aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all agricultural entities within Davao City; it also imposed a 30-meter buffer zone and a three-month transition period to shift to alternative spraying methods. The ordinance took effect 30 days after publication, with enforcement to begin three months after effectivity. City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007; publication occurred in Mindanao Pioneer, making the act effective on March 23, 2007.
  • The PBGEA and two of its member companies challenged the ordinance in the RTC, seeking relief via TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The petition was joined by Mosqueda and other residents. The RTC granted leave to intervene and later issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
  • The RTC, after trial, upheld the ordinance as valid and constitutional on September 22, 2007, finding the city had valid police power under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code, that the ordinance had a valid classification, that aerial spraying posed greater health/environment risks, and that the ordinance enjoyed a presumption of constitutionality.
  • The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on January 9, 2009, voiding Section 5 as oppressive and impracticable, finding no adequate basis to justify a three-month transition period, and holding that the ordinance’s 30-meter buffer zone and the broad ban on aerial spraying violated equal protection and due process.
  • The City of Davao and intervenors sought review; the Supreme Court ultimately denied the petitions for review, affirmed the CA decision, and permanently enjoined enforcement of Ordinance No. 0309-07. The Court also addressed issues relating to the precautionary principle, the authority of the FPA (Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority) under PD 1144, and the interplay between local police power and national pesticide regulation.

Issues

  1. Mosqueda, et al. (G.R. No. 189185)
  2. Does the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 is oppressive and an unreasonable exercise of police power align with due process requirements?
  3. Does Ordinance No. 0309-07 violate the Equal Protection Clause by its classifications and scope, particularly as to aerial spraying and the 30-meter buffer zone?
  4. Does the 30-meter buffer zone constitute taking of property without due process or just compensation?

  5. Is aerial spraying of fungicides safe for people and the environment?

  6. City of Davao (G.R. No. 189305)
  7. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 oppressive and an unreasonable exercise of delegated police power?
  8. Did the CA err in holding that Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause?
  9. Does Ordinance No. 0309-07 constitute taking of property without due process via the buffer zone or otherwise?
  10. Is aerial spraying of fungicides safe for the public and environment?

Ruling

  1. Mosqueda, et al. (G.R. No. 189185)
  2. Yes — Section 5 is oppressive and an unreasonable exercise of police power. The three-month transition period to shift from aerial spraying to other methods is impracticable given the scale, topography, and the required civil works and capital, making compliance effectively impossible within the period.
  3. Yes — Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause due to underinclusive/overinclusive classifications; banning aerial spraying across all substances and activities fails to distinguish between substances, concentrations, and contexts, and imposes a burden beyond what is rationally related to the stated objective.
  4. No (as a taking) — The buffer zone is not, by itself, a per se taking requiring compensation; however, because Section 6 is found invalid on equal protection grounds, the challenged provisions cannot stand. The Court did not sustain a finding of a pure regulatory taking that would require just compensation.

  5. No — The precautionary principle lacks a sufficient scientific basis in the record to justify a blanket ban; the Court requires scientific evidence or adequate regulatory guidance before applying precautionary measures.

  6. City of Davao (G.R. No. 189305)
  7. Yes — The CA erred in upholding a three-month transition period as a valid exercise of police power given the impracticability of conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying within that period.
  8. Yes — The CA erred in applying a strict equal protection analysis to hold Section 5 as oppressive and Section 6 as unconstitutional.
  9. Yes — Ordinance No. 0309-07 is ultra vires; the Local Government Code vests pesticide regulation primarily in the FPA under PD 1144, and local ordinances cannot displace or override that framework.
  10. No — The Court did not validate the safety of aerial spraying; rather, it found the ordinance unconstitutional and did not base its decision on proven safety concerns.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

  • Local Government Code hierarchy: While LGUs have general welfare and police powers (Section 16 and 458) to promote health and a balanced ecology, their powers are not unlimited and must be exercised consistent with state laws and policies. Local regulations cannot encroach upon fields already governed by national agencies (here, the FPA’s jurisdiction under PD 1144).
  • Pesticide regulation framework: The Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) has authority to determine uses, establish good agricultural practices, and restrict or ban pesticides in specific areas or periods. Local ordinances cannot substitute or contradict FPA rules, including those in Memorandum Circular No. 02 (GAP and safety standards for aerial spraying).
  • Equal protection analysis: The court applied a rational-basis approach, recognizing that the ordinance’s classifications must be substantial, germane to the purposes, and not overly burdensome. The ban against aerial spraying across the board, without tailoring to substances, concentrations, or contexts, was underinclusive and overinclusive, failing to meet rational relations to the stated objectives.
  • Transition period: The three-month transition obligation imposed substantial, impracticable civil works and capital requirements for configuring plantations to new methods, rendering enforcement oppressive and contrary to due process.
  • Precautionary principle: The court found no adequate scientific basis in the record to justify a broad precautionary ban; lack of full scientific certainty does not automatically authorize drastic measures absent empirical support.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

  • General Welfare / Police Power under Local Government Code
  • Preemption and Ultra Vires: Local ordinances cannot contravene or displace national regulatory frameworks (PD 1144 and FPA regulations).
  • Equal Protection: Classifications in regulatory statutes must rest on substantial distinctions and be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
  • Precautionary Principle: Requires evidence of threat and a rational basis for preventive action; cannot supplant scientific assessment with precaution alone.
  • Takings / Due Process: Regulatory measures can implicate takings concerns if they permanently deprive property of all economically beneficial use; here, the buffer zone analysis did not justify compensation, but the overarching equal protection issues led to invalidation.
  • Regulatory Scope vs. Regulatory Take: A complete prohibition is not per se a taking but must be validated against constitutionally permissible scope and rational classifications.

Disposition

  • Mosqueda, et al. (G.R. No. 189185): The consolidated petitions are DENIED on the merits; the Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals’ decision declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL; the City of Davao is permanently enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No. 0309-07; costs awarded.
  • City of Davao (G.R. No. 189305): The petitions are DENIED; the Court AFFIRMS the CA decision declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL; permanent injunction against enforcement remains; costs awarded.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

  • Concurring Opinion: Justice Leonen wrote a separate concurring opinion addressing aspects of the decision (not detailed here). The main opinion was delivered by Justice Bersamin, with a concurrence by Justice Leonen.

Significance / Notes

  • Clarifies that local governments must exercise general welfare and police powers within the constitutional and statutory framework, and cannot unilaterally displace national pesticide regulation and the FPA’s authority under PD 1144.
  • Highlights the need for scientifically grounded basis before invoking precautionary measures in environmental health policy.
  • Illustrates the limits of using broad, uniform regulatory bans (such as a blanket aerial-spraying ban) when classifications risk underinclusion or overinclusion and when feasible regulatory options exist within national standards (e.g., GAP compliance and registered application methods).
  • Demonstrates the courts’ supervisory role in ensuring that local ordinances align with national laws and do not impose undue burdens on industry without adequate justification.
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