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Daniel A. Villareal, Jr. vs. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System

Daniel A. Villareal, Jr. vs. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
  1. Case Title and Citation

    Daniel A. Villareal, Jr. (on behalf of Orlando A. Villareal), petitioner, vs. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, respondent.
    G.R. No. 232202, February 28, 2018
    Supreme Court - First Division
    Ponente: Noel Gimenez Tijam, Associate Justice


  1. Facts

    • On October 30, 2000, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City dismissed MWSS’s unlawful detainer action against Orlando A. Villareal (Civil Case No. 21293) for being prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.
    • On September 27, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, reversed and ordered Orlando and those claiming under him to vacate the premises at No. 18 V. Heizer St., Balara Filters, Quezon City, and to pay reasonable compensation from November 7, 1997 until possession was restored.
    • On December 15, 2002, the RTC Clerk of Court issued an Entry of Judgment stating the September 27, 2002 RTC decision became final and executory.
    • On May 17, 2004, MWSS filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with the MeTC.
    • On July 2, 2004, Orlando filed a Comment/Opposition to the motion, invoking compliance with Section 23 of R.A. No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act).
    • On July 28, 2014, the MeTC issued an Order granting MWSS’s motion; on October 26, 2015, the MeTC issued a Writ of Execution for satisfaction of the RTC decision.
    • Pursuant to the writ, on April 19, 2016, the MeTC sheriff issued a Sheriff’s Notice to Vacate and Pay; on April 20, 2016, Daniel A. Villareal, Jr. (on behalf of Orlando) filed a petition for certiorari (Rule 65) with RTC-Branch 215 challenging the writ and the sheriff’s notice.
    • On February 9, 2017, RTC-Branch 215 dismissed the petition; the RTC denied reconsideration on May 17, 2017.
    • Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, challenging the RTC decision as an erroneous application of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence.

  1. Issues

  2. Did the RTC err in dismissing the petition by upholding a writ of execution issued after the five-year period prescribed in Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court? (Yes/No)
  3. Was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 a proper remedy for the questions raised? (Yes/No)

  1. Ruling

  2. Yes - The RTC erred; the writ of execution issued on October 26, 2015 was void because the court lacked jurisdiction to issue it after the five-year period from entry of judgment had elapsed.
  3. Yes - Resort to a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was proper because the dispute raised questions of law concerning the application of Section 6, Rule 39.

  1. Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

    • Statute and rule: Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court permits execution by motion within five years from the date of entry of a final and executory judgment; thereafter, a judgment may be enforced only by action (and the revived judgment may be enforced within ten years under the statute of limitations).
    • Date of entry: The RTC decision became final and executory on December 15, 2002; that date is the point from which the five-year period is computed.
    • Two required acts within five years: Jurisprudence requires (a) filing of the motion for issuance of writ of execution and (b) the court’s actual issuance of the writ to occur within the five-year period (see Olongapo City v. Subic Water and Sewerage Co., Inc.; Arambulo v. Court of First Instance of Laguna).
    • Application to facts: MWSS filed its motion on May 17, 2004 (within five years), satisfying the first act. However, the MeTC did not issue the writ until October 26, 2015, well beyond the five-year period; thus the writ was issued without jurisdiction and is null and void (see Ramos v. Garciano; Rubio v. Alabata; Phil. Veterans Bank v. Solid Homes, Inc.).
    • Exceptions: Courts have allowed execution by motion after five years only where delay was caused by the judgment debtor or where execution was stayed for reasons attributable to the debtor (e.g., agreement, injunction, appeal acting as supersedeas, death of a party) (see Yau v. Silverio, Sr.; Camacho v. CA). Here, MWSS did not demonstrate that the delay was caused by Orlando; the filing of a comment/opposition by Orlando did not constitute a stay or otherwise toll the five-year period such that the MeTC could validly issue the writ in 2015.
    • Procedural remedy: The Court distinguished Rule 45 and Rule 65 remedies, holding that Rule 45 review is appropriate where only questions of law are presented (see Ysidoro v. Justice Leonardo De Castro, et al.), which applied here because the error alleged concerned legal application of Section 6, Rule 39 rather than the RTC’s jurisdiction.

    • A judgment creditor must accomplish both the filing of a motion for execution and the court’s issuance of the writ within five years from the entry of judgment under Section 6, Rule 39; failure of either act within that period renders execution by motion invalid.
    • After the five-year period, enforcement must be pursued by an independent action for revival of judgment within the applicable statute of limitations.
    • A writ of execution issued after the five-year period is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
    • Exceptions to the five-year rule apply only when delay is caused or consented to by the judgment debtor (e.g., stay by agreement, injunction, appeal acting as supersedeas, death); mere filing of comments does not automatically toll the period.
    • A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy when only questions of law are raised.

  1. Disposition

    • The petition for review is GRANTED.
    • The Decision dated February 9, 2017 and the Order dated May 17, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, in Case No. R-QZN-16-03654-CV are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
    • The writ of execution issued by the MeTC on October 26, 2015 was declared null and void for being issued after the five-year period provided in Section 6, Rule 39; the Sheriff’s Notice to Vacate and Pay issued pursuant thereto was affected accordingly.

  1. Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

    • None. The decision lists the concurrence of the Court’s members but contains no separate concurring or dissenting opinions.

  1. Significance / Notes

    • Clarifies that the five-year prescriptive period in Section 6, Rule 39 applies both to the judgment creditor (who must file the motion) and to the court (which must issue the writ) — both acts must occur within five years from entry of judgment.
    • Emphasizes that a court’s issuance of a writ after the five-year period is void and cannot be validated by the parties’ inaction.
    • Confirms limited exceptions where delay attributable to the debtor or an authorized stay can toll the five-year period; mere filing of comments/opposition does not automatically qualify as such a tolling event.
    • Reinforces the need for judgment creditors to monitor and act promptly: if a court does not issue a writ within five years, the creditor’s available remedy is an independent action for revival within the statute of limitations.
    • Reiterates the appropriate procedural vehicle for appellate review: Rule 45 for pure questions of law, Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion/jurisdictional claims.
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