Zenaida Silver and Nelson Salcedo vs. People of the Philippines

Posted Aug 14, 2019

By Anonymous

7 min read

Case Title and Citation

Zenaida E. Silver and Nelson Salcedo, petitioners, vs. Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray, in her capacity as Judge Designate, Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 11, Davao City, People of the Philippines, Loreto Hao, Kenneth Hao, Atty. Amado L. Cantos, Zenaida Talattad and Maureen Ella M. Macasindil, respondents.
G.R. No. 219157, August 14, 2019
Supreme Court - Second Division
Ponente: Lazaro-Javier, J.

Facts

Petitioner Zenaida Silver operated a vehicle buy-and-sell business under the name “ZSH Commercial.”
On February 10, 2005, she won the Bureau of Customs (BOC) auction in General Santos City as the bidder for 95 motor vehicles and assorted parts; she allegedly financed the bid through Loreto Hao pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement dated February 4, 2005 and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Parties agreed on arrangements including loan repayment, profit sharing, and that Silver would furnish price lists and handle certain advances; Silver alleged Loreto Hao did not release the loan as agreed.
Silver authorized Kenneth Hao (nephew of Loreto Hao) by special power of attorney to sell the items and act as liaison; she later alleged unauthorized dispositions by Kenneth Hao of 64 items without accounting, and that several vehicles were registered in third parties’ names (including Zenaida Talattad and Maureen Macasindil).
Loreto Hao contended Silver failed to timely pay an earlier bid, that he provided manager’s checks for the February 10, 2005 auction, and that Silver executed a Deed of Absolute Sale and Assignment of Rights dated February 12, 2005 in his favor; he alleged Silver sold parts and provided partial proceeds, and that he later revoked agreements and transferred vehicles to his compound.
Disputes led to multiple criminal complaints and countercharges alleging carnapping, qualified theft, estafa, perjury, and falsification against Silver, Nelson Salcedo (a police officer who accompanied a sheriff), Kenneth Hao, and others.
Petitioner Silver filed replevin and related actions for recovery of possession; RTC-Branch 16 issued an order dated October 17, 2005 commanding seizure of 22 vehicles; Sheriff Abe Andres seized nine vehicles; petitioners allegedly caused eight vehicles to be moved without court permission.
The Office of the City Prosecutor initially dismissed complaints by Joint Resolution dated November 17, 2005. The Department of Justice, by Joint Resolution dated June 27, 2007, found probable cause against Silver, Nelson Salcedo, and others for violation of RA 6539 and directed filing of eight criminal informations.
The eight informations were initially raffled to RTC-Branch 14; warrants of arrest were issued but later withdrawn by the prosecution after reinvestigation and the case was dismissed; on petition for review the DOJ directed reinstatement of the informations by Resolution dated July 10, 2009.
The eight informations were subsequently docketed before RTC-Branch 11 as Criminal Case Nos. 66,237-09 to 66,244-09. By Order dated April 28, 2011, Branch 11 directed warrants of arrest against Silver, Nelson Salcedo and several co-accused; a joint order dated September 14, 2012 denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals arguing the presiding judges did not personally determine probable cause. The Court of Appeals, by Decision dated August 14, 2014, dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion and that the trial judges personally evaluated the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents and conducted a hearing.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration per Resolution dated June 2, 2015. Petitioners invoked the Supreme Court review challenging the finding of probable cause and the issuance of warrants.

Issues

Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the trial court’s finding of probable cause against petitioners for violation of RA 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act)?
Did the trial court violate Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing warrants of arrest?
Was a categorical finding of necessity of placing petitioners under immediate custody required for the warrants issued by the Regional Trial Court?

Ruling

No - The petition lacks merit; the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the trial court’s finding of probable cause for violation of RA 6539.
No - The trial judges personally evaluated the prosecutor’s report, supporting documents, and held a hearing and/or reviewed the parties’ pleadings before issuing or denying warrants, satisfying Section 6(a), Rule 112.
No - The requirement that the judge explicitly find necessity of immediate custody applies to warrants issued by first-level courts (municipal trial courts), not to regional trial courts.

Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

Statutory and doctrinal standard:
- Section 6(a), Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the RTC judge to personally evaluate the prosecutor’s resolution and supporting evidence within ten days of filing and, if probable cause is found, to issue a warrant of arrest. The judge’s determination concerns probability, not certainty, of guilt.
- Probable cause for arrest is based on facts and circumstances leading a reasonably prudent person to believe an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested; the standard for issuing warrants is less stringent than for conviction.
Judicial duty to evaluate records:
- Precedent (Soliven v. Makasiar; People v. Inting; Lim v. Felix; Allado v. Diokno; Webb; Roberts) establishes that judges must personally evaluate the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents (affidavits, transcripts, and other materials) and may call for additional testimony when circumstances require; a judge cannot issue a warrant solely on the prosecutor’s bare certification.
Application to this case:
- The RTC Order dated April 28, 2011 and the subsequent Joint Order dated September 14, 2012 demonstrate that Judges Belo and Daray considered the DOJ resolutions, the informations, prior RTC proceedings, the prosecutor’s ex parte manifestation, oppositions, and held a clarificatory hearing; they required and reviewed parties’ pleadings and position papers before issuing or denying relief.
- Evidence showed eight subject vehicles were registered with the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in the private respondents’ names; LTO certificates of registration create a strong presumption of ownership (Amante v. Serwelas).
- The vehicles were placed under custodia legis at the time petitioners removed them; taking vehicles under those circumstances without owner consent supports probable cause for carnapping as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539 (elements adopted from People v. Bustinera).
Scope of review:
- The Supreme Court generally does not reweigh factual findings on probable cause made by trial courts except in exceptional circumstances; the record did not present such exceptional circumstances warranting reversal.
Custody-necessity requirement:
- The specific requirement that a judge make a categorical finding of necessity of immediate custody to prevent frustration of justice is a rule applicable to warrants issued by first-level courts (Section 6(b)), not to warrants issued by RTCs.

Doctrine / Legal Principle

A judge issuing a warrant must personally evaluate the prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting documents (affidavits, transcripts, and other records) before issuing a warrant; reliance on the prosecutor’s certification alone is insufficient.
The proper standard for issuing a warrant is probable cause—a probability assessment distinct from proof beyond reasonable doubt.
A certificate of registration issued by the LTO creates a strong presumption of ownership in favor of the registered owner.
The requirement to make an explicit finding that immediate custody is necessary to prevent frustration of justice is confined to warrants issued by municipal or other first-level courts, not by regional trial courts.
The Supreme Court will not lightly disturb a trial court’s factual determinations on probable cause absent exceptional circumstances.

Disposition

The petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated August 14, 2014 and the Resolution dated June 2, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05161-MIN are AFFIRMED.
The trial court’s orders finding probable cause and directing issuance of warrants of arrest were upheld.

Concurring / Dissenting Opinions

The decision was concurred in by Caguioa (Acting Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., and Zalameda, JJ.
Carpio, Senior Associate Justice (Chairperson), was on official leave.

Significance / Notes

Reinforces the constitutional and procedural requirement that judges personally assess the prosecutor’s report and supporting materials before issuing warrants; the judge’s review may be cursory or exhaustive depending on circumstances.
Confirms that RTC judges are not bound by the prosecutor’s certification and must independently ascertain whether the record supports probable cause.
Affirms the evidentiary weight of LTO certificates of registration as creating a strong presumption of ownership in vehicle disputes affecting criminal liability for carnapping.
Clarifies that the rule requiring a specific finding of necessity for immediate custody applies to first-level courts and not to regional trial courts.
Illustrates the limited circumstances under which appellate courts will overturn trial-court findings of probable cause.

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